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Historically, periods of high indebtedness have been associated with a rising incidence of default or
restructuring of public and private debts. A subtle type of debt restructuring takes the form of “financial
repression.” Financial repression includes directed lending to government by captive domestic audiences
(such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of cross-border capital
movements, and (generally) a tighter connection between government and banks. In the heavily regulated
financial markets of the Bretton Woods system, several restrictions facilitated a sharp and rapid reduction
in public debt/GDP ratios from the late 1940s to the 1970s. Low nominal interest rates help reduce
debt servicing costs while a high incidence of negative real interest rates liquidates or erodes the realYDOXH
of government debt. Thus, financial repression is most successful in liquidating debts when accompanied
by a steady dose of inflation. Inflation need not take market participants entirely by surprise and, in
effect, it need not be very high (by historic standards). For the advanced economies in our sample,
real interest rates were negative roughly ½ of the time during 1945-1980. For the United States and
the United Kingdom our estimates of the annual liquidation of debt via negative real interest rates
amounted on average from 3 to 4 percent of GDP a year. For Australia and Italy, which recorded higher
inflation rates, the liquidation effect was larger (around 5 percent per annum). We describe some ofWKH
regulatory measures and policy actions that characterized the heyday of the financial repressionera.
Carmen M. Reinhart
Peterson Institute for International Economics













  “Some people will think the 2 ¾ nonmarketable bond is a 
trick issue. We want to meet that head on. It is. It is an attempt to 
lock up as much as possible of these longer-term issues.” 
 
 
  Assistant Secretary of the Treasury William 
McChesney Martin Jr. 
FOMC minutes, March 1-2, 1951 
Remarks on the 1951 conversion of short-term 
marketable US Treasury debts for 29-year non-
marketable bonds.  Mr. Martin was subsequently 
Chairman of the Board of Governors, 1951-1970. 
 
 
The decade that preceded the outbreak of the subprime crisis in the summer of 
2007 produced a record surge in private debt in many advanced economies, including the 
United States.  The period prior to the 2001 burst of the “tech bubble” was associated 
with a marked rise in the leverage of nonfinancial corporate business; in the years 2001-
2007, the debts of the financial industry and households reached unprecedented heights.
1  
The decade following the crisis may yet mark a record surge in public debt during 
peacetime, at least for the advanced economies.  It is not surprising that debt reduction, of 
one form or another, is a topic that is receiving substantial attention in academic and 
policy circles alike.
2 
 Throughout history, debt/GDP ratios have been reduced by (i) economic growth; 
(ii) a substantive fiscal adjustment/austerity plans; (iii) explicit default or restructuring of 
private and/or public debt; (iv) a sudden surprise burst in inflation; and (v) a steady 
                                                 
1 The surge in private debt is manifest in both the gross external debt figures of the private sector (see Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2010,  for careful and extensive historical documentation since 1970 and Reinhart 
http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/  for a splicing of their data with the latest IMF/World Bank figures) 
and domestic bank credit (as documented in Reinhart, 2010).  Relative to GDP, these debt measures 
reached unprecented heights during 2007-2010 in many advanced economies. 
2 Among recent studies, see for example, Alesina and Ardagna (2009), IMF (2010), Lilico, Holmes and 
Sabeen (2009) on debt reduction via fiscal adjustment and Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2006), Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein on debt reduction through default and restructuring. 2 
 
dosage of financial repression that is accompanied by an equally steady dosage of 
inflation. (Financial repression is defined in Box 1)  It is critical to clarify that options 
(iv) and (v) are only viable for domestic-currency debts.  Since these debt-reduction 
channels are not necessarily mutually exclusive, historical episodes of debt reduction 
have owed to a combination of more than one of these channels.
3 
Hoping that substantial public and private debt overhangs are resolved by growth 
may be uplifting but it is not particularly practical from a policy standpoint.  The 
evidence, at any rate, is not particularly encouraging, as high levels of public debt appear 
to be associated with lower growth.
4  The effectiveness of fiscal adjustment/austerity in 
reducing public debt and, particularly, their growth consequences, (which are the subject 
of some considerable debate) is beyond the scope of this paper.  The incidence of explicit 
default or debt restructuring (or forcible debt conversions) among advanced economies 
(through and including World War II episodes) and emerging markets as well as 
hyperinflation as debt-reduction mechanisms is analyzed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 
and 2011).   
The aim of this paper is to document the more subtle and gradual form of debt 
restructuring or “taxation” that has ocurred via financial repression (as defined in Box 1).  
We show that such repression helped reduce lofty mountains of public debt in many of 
the advanced economies in the decades following World War II and subsequently in 
emerging markets, where financial liberalization is of more recent vintage.
5 We find that 
                                                 
3 For instance, in analyzing external debt reduction episodes in emerging markets, Reinhart, Rogoff, and 
Savastano (2003) suggest that default and debt/restructuring played a leading role in most of the episodes 
they identify.  However, in numerous cases the debt restructurings (often under the umbrella of IMF 
programs) were accompanied by debt repayments associated with some degree of fiscal adjustment. 
4 See Checherita and Rother (2010), Kumar and Woo (2010), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). 
5 In a recent paper, Aizenman and Marion (2010) stress the important role played by inflation in reducing 
U.S. World War II debts and develop a framework to highlight how the government may be tempted to 3 
 
financial repression in combination with inflation played an important role in reducing 
debts.  Inflation need not take market participants entirely by surprise and, in effect, it 
need not be very high (by historic standards). In effect, financial repression via controlled 
interest rates, directed credit and persistent, positive inflation rates is still an effective 
way of reducing domestic government debts in the world’s second largest economy--
China.
6 
Prior to the 2007 crisis, it was deemed unlikely that advanced economies could 
experience financial meltdowns of a severity to match those of the pre-World War II era; 
the prospect of a sovereign default in wealthy economies was similarly unthinkable.
7 
Repeating that pattern, the ongoing discussion of how public debts have been reduced in 
the past has focused on the role played by fiscal adjustment.  It thus appears that it has 
also been collectively “forgotten” that the widespread system of financial repression that 
prevailed for several decades (1945-1980s) worldwide played an instrumental role in 
reducing or “liquidating” the massive stocks of debt accumulated during World War II in 
many of the advanced countries, United States inclusive. 
8 We document this 
phenomenon.   
The next section discusses how previous “debt-overhang” episodes have been 
resolved since 1900.  There is a brief sketch of the numerous defaults, restructurings, 
                                                                                                                                                 
follow that route in the near future.  However, the critical role played by financial repression (regulation) in 
keeping nominal interest rates low and producing negative real interest rates was not part of their analysis. 
6 Bai et. al. (1999), for example, present a framework that provides a general rationale for financial 
repression as an implicit taxation of savings. They argue that when effective income-tax rates are very 
uneven, as common in developing countries, raising some government revenue through mild financial 
repression can be more efficient than collecting income tax only. 
7 The literature and public discussion surrounding “the great moderation” attests to this benign view of the 
state of the macroeconomy in the advanced economies.  See, for example, McConnell and Perez-Quiros 
(2000). 
8 For the political economy of this point see the analysis presented in Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi Ferretti 
(1993). They present a framework and stylized evidence to support it that strong governments coupled with 
weak central banks may impose capital controls so as to enable them to raise more seigniorage and keep 
interest rates artificially low—facilitating domestic debt reduction.. 4 
 
conversions (forcible and “voluntary”) that dealt with the debts of World War I and the 
Great Depression.  This narrative, which follows Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2011), 
primarily serves to highlight the substantially different route taken after World War II to 
deal with the legacy of high war debts.  
Section III provides a short description of the types of financial sector policies 
that facilitated the liquidation of public debt.  Hence, our analysis focuses importantly on 
regulations affecting interest rates (with the explicit intent on keeping these low) and on 
policies creating “captive” domestic audiences that would hold public debts (in part 
achieved through capital controls, directed lending, and an enhanced role for 
nomarketable public debts).  
We also focus on the evolution of real interest rates during the era of financial 
repression (1945-1980s). We show that real interest rates were significantly lower during 
1945-1980 than in the freer capital markets before World War II and after financial 
liberalization. This is the case irrespective of the interest rate used--whether central bank 
discount, treasury bills, deposit, or lending rates and whether for advanced or emerging 
markets.   For the advanced economies, real ex-post interest rates were negative in about 
half of the years of the financial repression era compared to less than 15 percent of time 
since the early 1980s. 
In Section IV, we provide a basic conceptual framework for calculating the 
“financial repression tax,” or more specifically, the annual “liquidation rate” of 
government debt. Alternative measures are also discussed.  These exercises use a detailed 
data base on a country’s public debt profile (coupon rates, maturities, composition, etc.) 
from 1945 to 1980 constructed by Sbrancia (2011).  This “synthetic” public debt portfolio 
reflects the actual shares of debts across the different spectrum of maturities as well as 5 
 
the shares of marketable versus nonmarketable debt (the latter involving both securitized 
debt as well as direct bank loans). 
Section V presents the central findings of the paper, which are estimates of the 
annual “liquidation tax” as well as the incidence of liquidation years for ten countries 
(Argentina, Australia, Belgium, India, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States). For the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
annual liquidation of debt via negative real interest rates amounted to 3 to 4 percent of 
GDP on average per year.  Such annual deficit reduction quickly accumulates (even 
without any compounding) to a 30-40 percent of GDP debt reduction in the course of a 
decade.  For other countries, which recorded higher inflation rates the liquidation effect 
was even larger. As to the incidence of liquidation years, Argentina sets the record with 
negative real rates recorded every single year from 1945 to 1980. 
Section VI examines the question of whether inflation rates were systematically 
higher during periods of debt reduction in the context of a broader 28-country sample that 
spans both the heyday of financial repression as well as the periods before and after.  We 
describe the algorithm used to identify the largest debt reduction episodes on a country-
by-country basis and, show that in 21 of the 28 countries inflation was higher during the 
larger debt reduction periods.  
Finally, we discuss some of the implications of our analysis for the current debt 
overhang and highlight areas for further research. There are detailed appendices which:  
(i) compare our methodology to other approaches in the literature that have been used to 
measure the extent of financial repression or calculate the financial repression tax; (ii) 
provide country-specific details on the behavior of real interest rates across regimes; and 
(iii) describe the coverage and extensive sources for the data compiled for this study.6 
 
Box 1: Financial Repression Defined 
 
Default, Restructuring and Financial Repression  The pillars of “Financial repression”  
 
The term financial repression was introduced in the literature by the works of 
Shaw (1973) and Ronald McKinnon (1973). Subsequently, the term became a way of 
describing emerging market financial systems prior to the widespread financial 
liberalization that began in the 1980 (see Agenor and Montiel, 2008, for an excellent 
discussion of the role of inflation and Giovannini and de Melo, 1993 and Easterly, 1989 
for country-specific estimates).  However, as we document in this paper, financial 
repression was also the norm for advanced economies during the post World War II 
and in varying degrees up through the 1980s.  We describe here some of its main 
features. 
 
(i) Explicit or indirect caps or ceilings on interest rates, particularly (but not 
exclusively) those on government debts.  These interest rate ceilings could be effected 
through various means including: (a) explicit government regulation (for instance, 
Regulation Q in the United States prohibited banks from paying interest on demand 
deposits and capped interest rates on saving deposits). (b) In many cases ceilings on 
banks’ lending rates were a direct subsidy to the government in cases where the 
government borrowed directly from the banks (via loans rather than securitized debt); 
(c) the interest rate cap could be in the context of fixed coupon rate nonmarketable 
debt; (d) or it could be maintained through central bank interest rate targets (often at the 
directive of the Treasury or Ministry of Finance when central bank independence was 
limited or nonexistent). Metzler’s (2003) monumental history of the Federal Reserve 
(Volume I) documents the US experience in this regard; Cukierman’s (1992) classic on 
central bank independence provides a broader international context. 
 
(ii) Creation and maintenance of a captive domestic audience that facilitated 
directed credit to the government.  This was achieved through multiple layers of 
regulations from very blunt to more subtle measures.  (a) Capital account restrictions 
and exchange controls orchestrated a “forced home bias” in the portfolio of financial 
institutions and individuals under the Bretton Woods arrangements.  (b) High reserve 
requirements (usually non-remunerated) as a tax levy on banks (see Brock, 1989, for an 
insightful international comparison). (c) Among more subtle measures, “prudential” 
regulatory measures requiring that institutions (almost exclusively domestic ones) hold 
government debts in their portfolios (pension funds have historically been a primary 
target); and (d) transaction taxes on equities (see Campbell and Froot, 1994) also act to 
direct investors toward government (and other) types of debt instruments. (e) 
prohibitions on gold transactions. 
 
(iii) Other common measures associated with financial repression aside from 
the ones discussed above are, direct ownership (China or India) of banks or extensive 
management of banks and other financial institutions (i.e. Japan).  Restrictions of entry 
to the financial industry and directing credit to certain industries are also features of 
repressed financial markets (see Beim and Calomiris, 2000).  7 
 
II. Default, Restructuring and Conversions: 
Highlights from 1920s-1950s 
 
Peaks and troughs in public debt/GDP are seldom synchronized across many 
countries’ historical paths.  There are, however, a few historical episodes where global 
(or nearly global) developments, be it a war or a severe financial and economic crisis, 
produces a synchronized surge in public debt, such as the one recorded for advanced 
economies since 2008.  Using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) database for 70 countries, 
Figure 1 provides central government debt/GDP for the advanced economy and emerging 
market subgroups since 1900. It is a simple arithmetic average that does not assign 
weight according to country size.   
 
1. Global debt surges and their resolution 
An examination of these two series identifies a total of five peaks in world 
indebtedness.   Three episodes (World War I, World War II, and the Second Great 
Contraction, 2008-present) are almost exclusively advanced economy debt peaks; one is 
unique to emerging markets (1980s debt crisis followed by the transition economies’ 
collapses); and the Great Depression of the 1930s is common to both groups.  World War 
I and Depression debts were importantly resolved by widespread default and explicit 
restructurings or predominantly forcible conversions of domestic and external debts in 
both the now-advanced economies, as well as the emerging markets.  Notorious 
hyperinflations in Germany, Hungary and other parts of Europe violently liquidated 
domestic-currency debts.  Table 1 and the associated discussion provide a chronology of 
these debt resolution episodes. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2011) document, debt 
reduction via default or restructuring has historically been associated with substantial 8 
 
declines in output in the run-up to as well as during the credit event and in its immediate 
aftermath.   
   
Figure 1. Surges in Central Government Public Debts and their Resolution: Advanced 
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Sources:  Reinhart (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2011), sources cited therein and the authors. 
Notes:  Listed in parentheses below each debt-surge episode are the main mechanisms for debt resolution 
besides fiscal austerity programs which were not implemented in any discernible synchronous pattern 
across countries in any given episode.  Specific default/restructuring years by country are provided in the 
Reinhart-Rogoff database and a richer level of detail for 1920s-1950s (including various conversions are 
listed in Table 1).  The “typical” forms of financial repression measures are discussed in Box 1 and greater 
detail for the core countries are provided in Table 2. 
 
The World War II debt overhang was importantly liquidated via the combination 
of financial repression and inflation, as we shall document.  This was possible because 
debts were predominantly domestic and denominated in domestic currencies. The robust 
post-war growth also contributed importantly to debt reduction in a way that was a 
marked contrast to the 1930s, during which the combined effects of deflation and output 9 
 
collapses worked worsen the debt/GDP balance in the way stressed by Irving Fisher 
(1931).  
The resolution of the emerging market debt crisis involved a combination of 
default or restructuring of external debts, explicit default or financial repression on 
domestic debt. In several episodes, notably in Latin America, hyperinflations in the mid-
to-late 1980s and early 1990s completed the job of significantly liquidating (at least for a 
brief interlude) the remaining stock of domestic currency debt (even when such debts 
were indexed, as was the case of Brazil). 
9 
 
2. Default, restructurings and forcible conversions in the 1930s 
Table 1 lists the known “domestic credit events” of the Depression.  Default on or 
restructuring of external debt (see the extensive notes to the table) also often 
accompanied the restructuring or default of the domestic debt.  All the Allied 
governments, with the exception of Finland, defaulted on (and remained in default 
through 1939 and never repaid) their World War I debts to the United States as economic 
conditions deteriorated worldwide during the 1930s.
10 
Thus, the high debts of the First World War and the subsequent debts associated 
with the Depression of the 1930s were resolved primarily through default and 
restructuring.  Neither economic growth nor inflation contributed much.  In effect, for all 
21 now-advanced economies, the median annual inflation rate for 1930-1939 was barely 
                                                 
9 Backward-looking indexation schemes are not particularly effective in hyperinflationary conditions. 
10 Finland, being under threat of Soviet invasion at the time, maintained payments on their debts to the 
United States so as to maintain the best possible relationship. 10 
 
above zero (0.4 percent). 
11   Real interest rates remained high through significant 
stretches of the decade. 
It is important to stress that during the period after WWI the gold standard was 
still in place in many countries, which meant that monetary policy was subordinated to 
keep a given gold parity. In those cases, inflation was not a policy variable available to 
policymakers in the same way that it was after the adoption of fiat currencies. 
                                                 
11 See Reinhart and Reinhart (2010). 11 
 
Table 1. Episodes of Domestic Debt Conversions, Default or Restructuring,1920s–1950s 
Country  Dates  Commentary 
For additional possible domestic defaults in several European countries during the 1930s, see notes below. 
Australia  1931/1932  The Debt Conversion Agreement Act in 1931/32 
which appears to have done something similar to the 
later NZ induced conversion. See New Zealand 
entry. 
1 
Bolivia  1927  Arrears of interest lasted until at least 1940. 
Canada (Alberta)  April 1935  The only province to default—which lasted for 
about 10 years. 
China  1932  First of several “consolidations”, monthly cost of 
domestic service was cut in half. Interest rates were 
reduced to 6 percent (from over 9 percent)—
amortization periods were about doubled in length. 
France  1932  Various redeemable bonds with coupons between 5 
and 7 percent, converted into a 4.5 percent bond 
with maturity in 75 years. 
Greece  1932  Interest on domestic debt was reduced by 75 percent 
since 1932; Domestic debt was about 1/4 of total 
public debt. 
Italy  November 6
th, 1926  Issuance of Littorio. There were 20.4 billion lire 
subject to conversion, of which 15.2 were “Buoni 
Ordinari”
12 
Italy   February 3
rd, 1934  5 percent Littorio (see entry above) converted into 
3.5 percent Redimibile 
Mexico  1930s  Service on external debt was suspended in 1928.  
During the 1930s, interest payments included 
“arrears of expenditure and civil and military 
pensions.” 
New Zealand  1933  In March 1933 the New Zealand Debt Conversion 
Act was passed providing for voluntary conversion 
of internal debt amounting to 113 million pounds to 
a basis of 4 per cent for ordinary debt and 3 per cent 
for tax-free debt.  Holders had the option of 
dissenting but interest in the dissented portion was 
made subject to an interest tax of 33.3 per cent. 
1 
Peru  1931  After suspending service on external debt on May 
29, Peru made “partial interest payments” on 
domestic debt. 
Romania  February 1933  Redemption of domestic and foreign debt is 
suspended (except for three loans). 
Spain  October 1936–April 1939  Interest payments on external debt were suspended, 
arrears on domestic debt service. 
United States  1933  Abrogation of the gold clause. In effect, the U.S. 
refused to pay Panama the annuity in gold due to 
Panama according to a 1903 treaty. The dispute was 
settled in 1936 when the US paid the agreed amount 
in gold balboas. 
United Kingdom  1932  Most of the outstanding WWI debt was 
consolidated into a 3.5 percent perpetual annuity. 
This domestic debt conversion was apparently 
voluntary. However, some of the WWI debts to the 
United States were issued under domestic (UK) law 
(and therefore classified as domestic debt) and these 
                                                 
12 These are bonds with maturity between 3 and 12 month issued at discount.  12 
 
were defaulted on following the end of the Hoover 
1931 moratorium. 
Uruguay  November  1, 1932–February, 
1937 
After suspending redemption of external debt on 
January 20, redemptions on domestic debt were 
equally suspended. 
Austria  December 1945  Restoration of schilling (150 limit per person). 
Remainder placed in blocked accounts. In 
December 1947, large amounts of previously 
blocked schillings invalidated and rendered 
worthless. Temporary blockage of 50 percent of 
deposits. 
Germany  June 20, 1948  Monetary reform limiting 40 Deutschemark per 
person.  Partial cancellation and blocking of all 
accounts. 
Japan  March 2, 1946–1952  After inflation, exchange of all bank notes for new 
issue (1 to 1) limited to 100 yen per person.  
Remaining balances were deposited in blocked 
accounts. 
Russia  1947  The monetary reform subjected privately held 
currency to a 90 percent reduction. 
  April 10, 1957  Repudiation of domestic debt (about 253 billion 
rubles at the time). 
     
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and the authors. 
1 See Schedvin (1970) and Prichard (1970), for accounts of the Australian and New Zealand conversions, 
respectively, during the Depression. Michael Reddell kindly alerted us to these episodes and references. 
Alex Pollock pointed out the relevance of widespread restrictions on gold holdings in the United States and 
elsewhere during the financial repression era. 
Notes:  We have made significant further progress in sorting out the defaults on World War I debts to the 
United States, notably by European countries. In all cases these episodes are classified as a default on 
external debts. However, in some case –such as the UK--some of the WWI debts to the US were also issued 
under the domestic law and, as such, would also qualify as a domestic default.  The external defaults on 
June 15, 1934 included: Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Poland, United Kingdom. Only Finland made payments. See New York Times, June 15, 1934.   
 
III. Financial Repression: policies and evidence from real interest rates 
 
 
1. Selected financial regulation measures during the “era of financial repression” 
One salient characteristic of financial repression is its pervasive lack of transparency.   
The reams of regulations applying to domestic and cross-border financial transactions 
and directives cannot be summarized by a brief description. Table 2 makes this clear by 
providing a broad sense of the kinds of regulations on interest rates and cross-border and 
foreign exchange transactions and how long these lasted since the end of the war in 1945.  
A common element across countries “financial architecture” not brought out in Table 2 is 13 
 
that domestic government debt played a dominant role in domestic institutions asset 
holdings--notably that of pension funds.  High reserve requirements, relative to the 
current practice in advanced economies and many emerging markets, were also a 
common way of taxing the banks not captured in our minimalist description.  The 
interested reader is referred to Brock (1989) and Agenor and Montiel (2008), who focus 
on the role of reserve requirements and their link to inflation (see also Appendix Table 
A.1.2 and accompanying discussion.)14 
 
Table 2:  Selected Measures Associated with Financial Repression  
   Domestic Financial Regulation     Capital Account-Exchange  
Country  Liberalization years (s) in italics with     Restrictions 
   emphasis on deregulation of interest 
rates. 
   Liberalization years (s) in italics 
           
Argentina   1977-82, 1987, and 1991-2001, Initial 
liberalization in 1977 was reversed in 
1982. Alfonsin government undertook 
steps to deregulate the financial sector 
in October 1987, some interest rates 
being freed at that time. The 
Convertibility Plan -March 1991-
2001, subsequently reversed.    
   1977-82 and 1991-2001. Between 1976 and 
1978 multiple rate system was unified, 
foreign loans were permitted at market 
exchange rates, and all forex transactions 
were permitted up to US$ 20,000 by 
September 1978.  Controls on inflows and 
outflows loosened over 1977-82. 
Liberalization measures were reversed in 
1982. Capital and exchange controls 
eliminated in 1991 and reinstated on 
December 2001. 
 
Australia  1980, Deposit rate controls lifted in 
1980. Most loan rate ceilings 
abolished in 1985. A deposit subsidy 
program for savings banks started in 
1986 and ended in 1987. 
   1983, capital and exchange controls 
tightened in the late 1970's, after the move 
to indirect monetary policy increased 
capital inflows. Capital account liberalized 
in 1983. 
Brazil  1976-79 and 1989 onwards, interest 
rate ceilings removed in 1976, but 
reimposed in 1979. Deposit rates fully 
liberalized in 1989. Some loan rates 
freed in 1988. Priority sectors 
continue to borrow at subsidized rates. 
Separate regulation on interest rate 
ceilings exists for the microfinance 
sector 
   1984, System of comprehensive foreign 
exchange controls abolished in 1984. In the 
1980's most controls restricted outflows. In 
the 1990's controls on inflows were 
strengthened and those on outflows 
loosened and (once again) in 2010. 
           
Canada  1967, with the revision of the Bank 
Act in 1967, interest rates ceilings 
were abolished. Further liberalizing 
measures were adopted in 1980 
(allowing foreign banks entry into the 
Canadian market) and 1986. 
   1970, mostly liberal regime. 
           
Chile  1974 but deepens after 1984, 
commercial bank rates liberalized in 
1974. Some controls reimposed in 
1982. Deposit rates fully market 
determined since 1985. Most loan 
rates are market determined since 
1984. 
   1979, capital controls gradually eased since  
1979. Foreign portfolio and direct 
investment is subject to a one year 
minimum holding period. During the 1990s, 
foreign borrowing is subject to a 30% 
reserve requirement. 
Colombia  1980, most deposit rates at 
commercial banks are market 
determined since 1980; all after 1990. 
Loan rates at commercial banks are 
market determined since the mid-70's. 
Remaining controls lifted by 1994 in 
all but a few sectors. Some usury 
ceilings remain. 
   1991, capital transactions liberalized in 
1991. Exchange controls were also reduced. 
Large capital inflows in the early 90's led to 
the reimposition of reserve requirements on 
foreign loans in 1993.   15 
 
Egypt  1991, interest rates liberalized.   
Heavy "moral suasion" on banks 
remains. 
   1991, Decontrol and unification of the 
foreign exchange system. Portfolio and 
direct investment controls partially lifted in 
the 90's. 
 
Finland  1982, gradual liberalization 1982-91. 
Average lending rate permitted to 
fluctuate within limits around the 
Bank of Finland base rate or the 
average deposit rate in 1986. Later in 
the year regulations on lending rates 
abolished. In 1987, credit guidelines 
discontinued, the Bank of Finland 
began open market operations in bank 
CD's and HELIBOR market rates 
were introduced. In 1988, floating 
rates allowed on all loans. 
 
   1982.Gradual liberalization 1982-91. 
Foreign banks allowed to establish 
subsidiaries in 1982. In 1984, domestic 
banks allowed to lend abroad and invest in 
foreign securities. In 1987, restrictions on 
long-term foreign borrowing on 
corporations lifted. In 1989, remaining 
regulations on foreign currency loans were 
abolished, except for households. Short-
term capital movements liberalized in 1991. 
In the same year, households were allowed 
to raise foreign currency denominated 
loans. 
France  1984, interest rates (except on 
subsidized loans) freed in 1984. 
Subsidized loans now available to all 
banks, are subject to uniform interest 
ceiling. 
   1986, in the wake of the dollar crisis 
controls on in/outflows tightened. The 
extensive control system established by 
1974, remains in place to early 80's. Some 
restrictions lifted in 1983-85. Inflows were 
largely liberalized over 1986-88. 
Liberalization completed in 1990. 
Germany  1980, interest rates freely market 
determined from the 70's to today. In 
the year indicated, further 
liberalizations were undertaken. 
   1974. Mostly liberal regime in the late 60's, 
Germany experiments with controls 
between 1970-73. Starting 1974, controls 
gradually lifted, and largely eliminated by 
1981. 
India  1992. Complex system of regulated 
interest rates simplified in 1992. 
Interest rate controls on D's and 
commercial paper eliminated in 1993 
and the gold market is liberalized. The 
minimum lending rate on credit over 
200,000 Rs eliminated in 1994. 
Interest rates on term deposits of over 
two years liberalized in 1995. 
 
   1991. Regulations on portfolio and direct 
investment flows eased in 1991. The 
exchange rate was unified in 1993/94. 
Outflows remained restricted, and controls 
remained on private off-shore borrowing. 
Italy  1983. Maximum rates on deposits and 
minimum rates on loans set by Italian 
Banker's Association until 1974. Floor 
prices on government bonds 
eliminated in 1992. 
 
   1985. Continuous operation of exchange 
controls in the 70's. Fragile BoP delays 
opening in early 80's. Starting in 1985, 
restrictions are gradually lifted. All 
remaining foreign exchange and capital 
controls eliminated by May 1990. 
Japan  1979. Interest rate deregulation started 
in 1979. Gradual decontrol of rates as 
money markets grow and deepen after 
85. Interest rates on most fixed-term 
deposits eliminates by 1993. Non time 
deposits rates freed in 1994. Lending 
rates market determined in the 90's 
(though they started in 1979, both 
external and domestic liberalizations 
were very gradual and cautious). 
   1979. Controls on inflows eased after 1979. 
Controls on outflows eased in the mid-80s. 
Forex restrictions eased in 1980. Remaining 
restrictions on cross border transactions 
removed in 1995. 16 
 
Korea  1991. Liberalizing measures adopted 
in the early 80's aimed at privatization 
and greater managerial leeway to 
commercial banks. Significant interest 
rate liberalization in four phases. 
Significant interest rate liberalization 
in four phases in the 90's: 1991, 1993-
94 and 1997. Most interest rate 
deregulated by 1995, except demand 
deposits and government supported 
lending. 
   1991. Current account gradually liberalized 
between 1985-87, and article VIII accepted 
in 1988. Capital account gradually 
liberalized, starting in 1991, usually 
following domestic liberalization. 
Restrictions on FDI and portfolio 
investment loosened in the early 90's. 
Beginning with outflows, inflows to 
security markets allowed cautiously only in 
the mid 90's. Complete liberalization 
planned for 2000. 
Malaysia  1978-1985 and 1987 onwards. 
Initially liberalized in 1978. Controls 
were reimposed in the mid-80's 
(especially 1985-87) and abandoned in 
1991. 
   1987. Measures for freer in/outflows of 
funds taken in 1973. Further ease of 
controls in 1987. Some capital controls 
reimposed in 1994. Liberalization of the 
capital account was more modest, and 
followed that of the current account. 
Mexico  1977, deepens after 1988.Time 
deposits with flexible interest rates 
below a ceiling permitted in 1977. 
Deposit rates liberalized in 1988-89. 
Loan rates have been liberalized since 
1988-89 except at development banks.    
   1985. Historically exchange regime much 
less restrictive than trade regime. Further 
gradual easing between mid-1985 to 1991. 
1972 Law gave government discretion over 
the sectors in which foreign direct 
investment was permitted. Ambiguous 
restrictions on fdi rationalized in 1989. 
Portfolio flows were further decontrolled in 
1989. 
New Zealand  1984. Interest rate ceilings removed in 
1976 and reimposed in 1981. All 
interest rate controls removed in the 
summer of 1984. 
   1984. All controls on inward and outward 
Forex transactions removed in 1984. 
Controls on outward investment lifted in 
1984. Restrictions on foreign companies' 
access to domestic financial markets 
removed in 1984. 
Philippines  1981. Interest rate controls mostly 
phased out between 1981-85. Some 
controls reintroduced during the 
financial crisis of 1981-87. Cartel-like 
interest rate fixing remains prevalent. 
   1981. Foreign exchange and investment 
controlled by the government in the 70's. 
After the 1983 debt crisis the peso was 
floated but with very limited interbank 
forex trading. Off-floor trading introduced 
in 1992. Between 1992-95 restrictions on 
all current and most capital account 
transactions were eliminated. Outward 
investment limited to $6 mill/person/year 
South Africa  1980. Interest rate controls removed in 
1980. South Africa Reserve Bank 
relies entirely on indirect instruments. 
Primary, Secondary and Interbank 
markets active and highly developed. 
Stock Exchange modern with high 
volume of transactions.    
   1983. Partially liberalized regime. 
Exchange controls on non-residents 
abolished in 1983. Limits still apply on 
purchases of forex for capital and current 
transactions by residents. Inward 
investment unrestricted, outward is subject 
to approval if outside Common Monetary 
Area. Several types of financial transactions 
subject to approval for monitoring and 
prudential purposes. 17 
 
Sweden  1980. Gradual liberalization in the 
early 80's. Ceilings on deposit rates 
abolished in 1978. In 1980, controls 
on lending rates for insurance 
companies were removed, as well as a 
tax on bank issues of certificate of 
deposits. Ceilings on bank loan rates 
were removed in 1985. 
   1980. Gradual liberalization between 1980-
90. Foreigners allowed to hold Swedish 
shares in 1980. Forex controls on stock 
transactions relaxed in 1986-88, and 
residents allowed to buy foreign shares in 
1988-89. In 1989 foreigners were allowed 
to buy interest bearing assets and remaining 
forex controls were removed. Foreign banks 
were allowed subsidiaries in 1986, and 
operation through branch offices in 1990. 
Thailand  1989. Removal of ceilings on interest 
rates begins in 1989. Ceiling on all 
time deposits abolished by 1990. 
Ceilings on saving deposits rates lifted 
in 1992. Ceilings on finance 
companies borrowing and lending 
rates abolished in 1992. 
   1991. Liberalized capital movements and 
exchange restrictions in successive waves 
between 1982-92. Article VIII accepted and 
current account liberalization in 1990, 
capital account liberalization starting in 
1991. Aggressive policy to attract inflows, 
but outflows freed more gradually. 
Restrictions on export of capital remain. 
The reserve requirement on short-term 
foreign borrowing in 7%. Currency controls 
introduced in May-June 1997. These 
controls restricted foreign access to baht in 
domestic markets and from the sale of Thai 
equities. Thailand relaxed limits on foreign 
ownership of domestic financial institutions 
in October of 1997. 
Turkey  1980-82 and 1987 onwards. 
Liberalization initiated in 1980 but 
reversed by 1982. Interest rates 
partially deregulated again in 1987, 
when banks were allowed to fix rates 
subject to ceilings determined by the 
Central Bank. Ceilings were later 
removed and deposit rates effectively 
deregulated.  Gold market liberalized 
in 1993. 
   1989. Partial external liberalization in the 
early 80's, when restrictions on inflows and 
outflows are maintained except for a limited 
set of agents whose transactions are still 
subject to controls. Restrictions on capital 




1981. The gold market, closed in early 
World War II, reopened only in 1954. 
The Bank of England stopped 
publishing the Minimum Lending 
Rate in 1981. In 1986, the government 
withdrew its guidance on mortgage 
lending. 
   1979. July 79: all restrictions on outward 
FDI abolished, and outward portfolio 
investment liberalized. Oct 1979: Exchange 
Control Act of 1947 suspended, and all 
remaining barriers to inward and outward 
flows of capital removed. 
United States  1982. 1951-Treasury accord/debt 
conversion swapped marketable short 
term debt for nonmarketable 29-year 
bond. Regulation Q suspended and 
S&Ls deregulated in 1982. 
In 1933, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt prohibits private holdings 
of all gold coins, bullion, and 
certificates. On December 31, 1974, 
Americans are permitted to own gold, 
other than just jewelry. 
   1974.  In 1961 Americans are forbidden to 
own gold abroad as well as at home. A 
broad array of controls were abolished in 
1974. 
           18 
 
Venezuela  1991-94 and 1996 onwards. Interest 
rate ceilings removed in 1991, 
reimposed in 1994, and removed again 
in 1996.  Some interest rate ceilings 
apply only to institutions and 
individuals not regulated by banking 
authorities (including NGOs).   
   1989-94 and 1996 onwards. FDI regime 
largely liberalized over 1989-90. Exchange 
controls on current and capital transactions 
imposed in 1994. The system of 
comprehensive forex controls was 
abandoned in April 1996. Controls are 
reintroduced in 2003.  
Sources: Reinhart and Reinhart (2011) and sources cited therein. See also FOMC minutes, March 1-2, 1951 
for US debt conversion particulars, http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.26.9055/ 
on current ceilings and related practices applied to microfinance, and National Mining Association (2006) 






2. Real Interest Rates 
One of the main goals of financial repression is to keep nominal interest rates 
lower than would otherwise prevail. This effect, other things equal, reduces the 
governments’ interest expenses for a given stock of debt and contributes to deficit 
reduction.  However, when financial repression produces negative real interest rates, this 
also reduces or liquidates existing debts. It is a transfer from creditors (savers) to 
borrowers (in the historical episode under study here--the government).   
The financial repression tax has some interesting political-economy properties.  
Unlike income, consumption, or sales taxes, the “repression” tax rate (or rates) are 
determined by financial regulations and inflation performance that are opaque to the 
highly politicized realm of fiscal measures.  Given that deficit reduction usually involves 
highly unpopular expenditure reductions and (or) tax increases of one form or another, 
the relatively “stealthier” financial repression tax may be a more politically palatable 
alternative to authorities faced with the need to reduce outstanding debts.  As discussed in 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and others, liberal capital- market regulations (the 
accompanying market-determined interest rates) and international capital mobility 
reached their heyday prior to World War I under the umbrella of the gold standard.  
World War I and the suspension of convertibility and international gold shipments it 
brought, and, more generally, a variety of restrictions on cross border transactions were 
the first blows to the globalization of capital.  Global capital markets recovered partially 
during the roaring twenties, but the Great Depression, followed by World War II, put the 
final nails in the coffin of laissez faire banking.  It was in this environment that the 
Bretton Woods arrangement of fixed exchange rates and tightly controlled domestic and 20 
 
international capital markets was conceived. 
13 In that context, and taking into account 
the major economic dislocations, scarcities, etc. which prevailed at the closure of the 
second great war, we witness a combination of very low nominal interest rates and 
inflationary spurts of varying degrees across the advanced economies.  The obvious 
result, were real interest rates--whether on treasury bills (Figure 2), central bank discount 
rates (Figure 3), deposits (Figure 4) or loans (not shown)—that were markedly negative   
during 1945-1946. 
For the next 35 years or so, real interest rates in both advanced and emerging 
economies would remain consistently lower than the eras of freer capital mobility before 
and after the financial repression era.  In effect, real interest rates (Figures 2-4) were, on 
average negative.
14  Binding interest rate ceilings on deposits (which kept real ex-post 
deposit rates even more negative than real ex-post rates on treasury bills, as shown in 
Figures 2 and 4) “induced” domestic savers to hold government bonds.  What delayed the 
emergence of leakages in the search for higher yields (apart from prevailing capital 
controls) was that the incidence of negative returns on government bonds and on deposits 
was (more or less) a universal phenomenon at this time
15.  The frequency distributions of 
real rates for the period of financial repression (1945-1980) and the years following 
financial liberalization (roughly 1981-2009 for the advanced economies) shown in the 
three panels of Figure 5, highlight the universality of lower real interest rates prior to the 
1980s and the high incidence of negative real interest rates. 
                                                 
13 In a framework where there are both tax collection costs and a large stock of domestic government, 
Aizenman and Guidotti, (1994) show how a government can resort to capital controls (which lower 
domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates) to reduce the costs of servicing the domestic debt.  
14 Note that real interest rates were lower in a high-economic-growth period of 1945 to 1980 than in the 
lower growth period 1981-2009; this is exactly the opposite of the prediction of a basic growth model and 
therefore indicative of significant impediments to financial trade. 
15 A comparison of the return on government bonds to that of equity during this period and its connection to 
“the equity premium puzzle” can be found in Sbrancia (2011). 21 
 
Such negative (or low) real interest rates were consistently and substantially 
below the real rate of growth of GDP, this is consistent with the observation of 
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) when they state “An important factor behind the dramatic 
drop (in US public debt) between 1945 and 1975 is that the growth rate of GNP exceeded 
the interest rate on government debt for most of that period.”  They fail to explain why 
this configuration should persist over three decades in so many countries. 
Figure 2: Average Ex-post Real Rate on Treasury Bills: Advanced Economies and 


















 (3-year moving average)
Financial Repression Era
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various sources listed in the Data 
Appendix, and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  The advanced economy aggregate is comprised of: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom.  
The emerging market group consists of:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela.  The average is unweighted and the 
country coverage is somewhat spotty prior for emerging markets to 1960, as detailed in the Data Appendix. 22 
 
Figure 3: Average Ex-post Real Discount Rate: Advanced Economies and Emerging 





















 (3-year moving average)
Financial Repression Era
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various sources listed in the Data 
Appendix, and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  The advanced economy aggregate is comprised of: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom.  
The emerging market group consists of:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela.  The average is unweighted and the 
country coverage is somewhat spotty prior for emerging markets to 1960, as detailed in the Data Appendix. 23 
 
Figure 4: Average Ex-post Real Interest Rates on Deposits: Advanced Economies and 


















 (3-year moving average)
Financial Repression Era
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various sources listed in the Data 
Appendix, and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  The advanced economy aggregate is comprised of: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom.  
The emerging market group consists of:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela.  The average is unweighted and the 
country coverage is spotty prior to 1960, as detailed in the Data Appendix. 
 
Real interest rates on deposits were negative in about 60 percent of the 
observations.  In effect, real ex-post deposit rates were below one percent about 83 
percent of the time.  Appendix Table A1.1, which shows for each country average real 
interest rates during the financial repression period (the dates vary, as highlighted in 
Table 2, depending when interest rates were liberalized) and thereafter substantiate our 
claims that low and negative real interest rates (by historical standards) were the norm 
across countries with very different levels of economic development.24 
 
Figure 5: Real Interest Rates Frequency Distributions: Advanced Economies, 1945-2009  
Treasury bill rate 
1945-1980 1981-2009
0 46.9 10.5
1 percent 61.6 25.2
2 percent 78.6 36.2
3 percent 88.6 55.0
Real Interest rate on T-bills


















1 percent 54.6 23.5
2 percent 69.4 37.0
3 percent 82.1 54.9
Real discount rate



















1 percent 82.7 58.0
2 percent 94.7 85.4
3 percent 98.4 96.6
Real Interest rate on deposits















The preceding analysis sets the general tone of what to expect, in terms of real 
rates of return on a portfolio of government debt, during the era of financial repression.  
For the United States, for example, Homer and Sylla (1963) describe 1946-1981 as the 
second (and longest) bear bond market in US history. 
16  To reiterate the point that the 
low real interest rates of the financial repression era were exceptionally low not only in 
relation to the post-liberalization period but also to the more liberal financial environment 
of pre-World War II, Figure 6 plots the frequency distribution of real interest rates on 
deposits for the United Kingdom over three subperiods, 1880-1939
17, 1945-1980, 1981-
2010. 
                                                 
16 They identify 1899-1920 as the first US bear bond market. 
17Excluding the WWI period. 26 
 














Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various sources listed in the Data 
Appendix, and authors’ calculations.  
The preceding analysis of real interest rates despite being qualitatively suggestive 
falls short of providing estimates of the magnitude of the debt-servicing savings and 
outright debt liquidation that accrued to governments during this extended period.  To fill 
in that gap the next section outlines the methodological approach we follow to quantify 





IV. The Liquidation of Government Debt: Conceptual and Data Issues 
This section discusses the data and methodology we develop to arrive at estimates 
of how much debt was liquidated via a combination of low nominal interest rates and 
higher inflation rates, or what we term “the liquidation effect.”
18 
Data requirements. Reliable estimates of the liquidation effect require 
considerable data, most of which is not readily available from even the most 
comprehensive electronic databases.  Indeed, most of the data used in these exercises 
comes from a broad variety of historical government publications, many which are quite 
obscure, as detailed in the Data Appendix.  The calculation of the “liquidation effect” is a 
clear illustration of a case where the devil lies in the details, as the structure of 
government debt varies enormously across countries and within countries over time. 
Differences in coupon rates, maturity and the distribution of marketable and 
nonmarketable debt, securitized debt versus loans from financial institutions, importantly 
shape the overall cost of debt financing for the government. There is no “single” 
government interest rate (such as a 3-month   t-bill or a 10-year bond) that is appropriate 
to apply to a hybrid debt stock.  The starting point to come up with a measure that reflects 
the true cost of debt financing is a reconstruction of the government’s debt profile over 
time. 
Sample. We employ two samples in our empirical analysis. We use the database 
from Sbrancia (2011) of the government’s debt profiles for 10 countries (Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, India, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States).  These were constructed from primary sources over the period 1945-
1990 where possible or over shorter intervals (determined by data availability) for a 
                                                 
18 Table A.1.2 and its accompanying discussion also examines other approaches to quantifying the financial 
repression tax . 28 
 
subset of the sample.  For the benchmark or basic calculations (described below), this 
involves data on a detailed composition of debt, including maturity, coupon rate, and 
outstanding amounts by instrument. For a more comprehensive measure, which takes into 
account capital gains or losses of holding government debt, bond price data are also 
required.   In all cases, we also use official estimates of consumer price inflation, which 
at various points in history may significantly understate the true inflation rates. 
19 Data on 
Nominal GDP and government tax revenues are used to express the estimates of the 
liquidation effect as ratios that are comparable across time and countries. 
For our broader analysis of the behavior of inflation during major debt reduction 
episodes, which has far less demanding data requirements (domestic public debt 
outstanding/GDP and inflation rates) our sample broadens to 28 countries from all 
regions for 1790-2010 (or subsamples therein).  The countries and their respective 
coverage are listed in Appendix Table A.1.3. 
 
1.  Benchmark basic estimates of the “liquidation effect” 
The debt portfolio. We construct a “synthetic portfolio” 
20 for the government’s 
total debt stock at the beginning of the year (fiscal or calendar, as noted).  This portfolio 
reflects the actual shares of debts across the different spectrum of maturities as well as 
the shares of marketable versus nonmarketable debt. 
                                                 
19  This is primarily due to the existence of price controls which were mainly imposed during WWII and 
remained for several years after the end of the conflict. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for estimates of 
the actual price level in the US and UK, and Wiles (1952) for post-WII U.K,  
20 The term “synthetic” is used in the sense that a hypothetical investor holds the total portfolio of 
government debt at the beginning of the period, which is defined as either the beginning of the calendar 
year or the fiscal year, depending on how the debt data is reported by the particular country. Country 
specifics are detailed in the data appendix.  The weights in this hypothetical portfolio are given by the 
actual shares of each component of debt in the total domestic debt of the government. 29 
 
Interest rate on the portfolio.  The “aggregate” nominal interest rate for a 
particular year is the coupon rate on a particular type of debt instrument weighted by that 
instrument’s share in the total stock of debt. 
21  We then aggregate across all debt 














(where i and π are nominal interest and inflation rates, respectively) is calculated on an 
ex-post basis using CPI inflation for the corresponding one-year period. It is a before-tax 
real rate of return (excluding capital gains or losses). 
22 
A definition of debt “liquidation years.”  Our benchmark calculations define a 
liquidation year, as one in which the real rate of interest (as defined above) is negative 
(below zero). This is a conservative definition of liquidation year; a more comprehensive 
definition would include periods where the real interest rate on government debt was 
below a “market” real rate.
23 
Savings to the government during liquidation years.  This concept captures the 
savings (in interest costs) to the government from having a negative real interest rate on 
government debt.  (As noted it is a lower bound on saving of interest costs, if the 
benchmark used assumed, for example a positive real rate of, say, two or three percent.) 
These savings can be thought of as having “a revenue-equivalent” for the government, 
which like regular budgetary revenues can be expressed as a share of GDP or as a share 
                                                 
21 Giovannini and de Melo (1993) state “the choice of a "representative" interest rate on domestic liabilities 
an almost impossible task and because there are no reliable breakdowns of domestic and foreign liabilities 
by type of loan and interest rate charged.” This is precisely the almost impossible task we undertake here.  
Their alternative methodology is described in appendix Table A.2. 
22 Some of the observations on inflation are sufficiently high to make the more familiar linear version of the 
Fisher equation a poor approximation. 
23 However, determining what such a market rate would be in periods of pervasive financial repression 
requires assumptions about whether real interest rates during that period would have comparable to the real 
interest that prevailed in period when market were liberalized and prices were market determined.  30 
 
of recorded tax revenues to provide standard measures of the “liquidation effect” across 
countries and over time.  The saving (or “revenue”) to the government or the “liquidation 
effect” or the “financial repression tax” is the real (negative) interest rate times the “tax 
base,” which is the stock of domestic government debt outstanding. 
 
2. An alternative measure of the liquidation effect based on total returns 
Thus far, our measure of the liquidation affect has been confined to savings to the 
government by way of annual interest costs.  However, capital losses (if bond prices fall) 
may also contribute importantly to the calculus of debt liquidation over time. This is the 
case because the market value of the debt will actually be lower than its face value. The 
market value of government debt obviously matters for investors’ wealth but also 
measures the true capitalized value of future coupon and interest payments. Moreover, a 
government (or its central bank) buying back existing debt could directly and 
immediately lower the par value of existing obligations.  Once we take into account 
potential price changes, the total nominal return or holding period return (HPR) for each 











where  t P  and  1 − t P  are the prices of the bond at time t and  1 − t  respectively, and  t C  is 
the annual interest payment (i.e., the nominal coupon rate).   
We use this total return measure as a supplement rather than as our core or 
benchmark “liquidation measure” (despite the fact that it incorporates more information 
on the performance of the bond portfolio).  Bond price data are only available for a subset 
of the securities that constitute the government portfolio and, more generally, consistent 31 
 
time series price data are more difficult to get for some of the countries in our sample.  It 
is also worth noting that while price movements for different bonds are generally in the 
same direction during a particular year, there are significant differences in the magnitudes 
of the price changes.  This cross-bond variation in price performance makes it difficult to 
infer what the price of nonmarketable debt (for which there is no price data altogether), as 
well as marketable bonds for which there is no price data.   As before, we define 
“liquidation years” as those periods in which the real return of the portfolio is negative. 
24 
 
3. The role of inflation and currency depreciation  
The idea of governments using inflation to liquidate debt is hardly a new one 
since the widespread adoption of fiat currency, as discussed earlier.
25  It is obvious that 
for any given nominal interest rate a higher inflation rate reduces the real interest rate on 
the debt, thus increasing the odds that real interest rates become negative and the year is 
classified as a “liquidation year.”  Furthermore, it is also evident that for any year that is 
classified as a liquidation year the higher the inflation rate (for a given coupon rate) the 
higher the saving to the government.   
Our approach helps to pinpoint periods (and countries) when inflation played a 
systematically larger role in eroding the debts of the government.  In addition, we can 
disentangle to what extent this was done via relatively short-lived “inflation surprises” 
(unanticipated inflation) or through a steady and chronic dose of moderate inflation over 
extended time horizons.  Because we do not have a direct measure of inflation 
                                                 
24 As described in Appendix 2, we also calculate an alternative definition of “liquidation years” by 
comparing the real return of the government debt portfolio to the real return in the equity market. 
According to this definition, a given year is considered a “liquidation year” if the return in a given year for 
the government portfolio is below the return in the stock market; we use the most comprehensive stock 
market index available for each country 
25 See for example, Calvo’s (1989) framework which highlights the role of inflation in debt liquidation 
even in the presence of short-term debt. 32 
 
expectations for much of the sample, we define inflation bursts or “surprises” in a more 
mechanical, ex-post manner. Specifically, we calculate a ten-year moving average for 
inflation and classify those years in which inflation was more than two-standard 
deviations above the 10-year average as an “inflation burst/surprise year”.  As the 10-year 
window may be arbitrarily too backward looking, we also perform the comparable 
exercise using a five-year moving average. 
 
V. The Liquidation of Government Debt: Empirical Estimates 
This section presents estimates of the “liquidation effect” for ten advanced and 
emerging economies for most of the post-World War II period.  Our main interest lies in 
the period prior to the process of financial liberalization that took hold during the 
1980s—that is, the era of financial repression.  However, as noted, this three-plus decade-
long stretch is by no means uniform.  The decade immediately following World War II 
was characterized by a very high public debt overhang—legacy of the war, a higher 
incidence of inflation, and often multiple currency practices (with huge black market 
exchange rate premiums) in many advanced economies.
26 The next decade (1960s) was 
the heyday of the Bretton Woods system with heavily regulated domestic and foreign 
exchange markets and more stable inflation rates in the advanced economies (as well as 
more moderate public debt levels).  The 1970s was quite distinct from the prior decades, 
as leakages in financial regulations proliferated, the fixed exchange rate arrangements 
under Bretton Woods among the advanced economies broke down, and inflation began to 
resurface in the wake of the global oil shock and accommodative monetary policies in the 
                                                 
26 See De Vries (1969), Horsefield (1969), Reinhart and Rogoff (2003). 33 
 
United States and elsewhere.  To this end, we also provide estimates of the liquidation of 
government debt for relevant subperiods.  
1. Incidence and magnitude of the “liquidation tax” 
Table 4 provides information on a country-by-country basis for the period under 
study; the incidence of debt liquidation years (as defined in the preceding section); the 
listing of the liquidation years; the average (negative) real interest rate during the 
liquidation years; and the minimum real interest rate recorded (and the year in which that 
minimum was reached).  Given its notorious high and chronic inflation history coupled 
with heavy-handed domestic financial regulation and capital controls during 1944-1974, 
it is not surprising that Argentina tops the list.  Almost all the years (97 percent) were 
recorded as liquidation years, as the Argentine real ex-post interest rates were negative in 
every single year during 1944-1974 except for 1953 (a just deflationary year). For India, 
that share was 53 percent (slightly more than one half of the 1949-1980 observations 
recorded negative real interest rates).  Before reaching the conclusion that this debt 
liquidation through financial repression was predominantly an emerging market 
phenomenon, it is worth noting that for the United Kingdom the share of liquidation 
years was about 48 percent during 1945-1980.  For the United States, the world’s 
financial center, a quarter of the years during that same period Treasury debt had negative 
real interest rates. 
As to the magnitudes of the financial repression tax (Table 4), real interest rates 
were most negative for Argentina (reaching a minimum of -53 percent in 1959). The 
share of domestic government debt in Argentina (and other Latin American countries) in 
total (domestic plus external) public debt was substantial during 1900-1950s; it is not 34 
 
surprising that in light of these real rates the domestic debt market all but disappeared and 
capital flight marched upwards (capital controls notwithstanding). By the late 1970s 
Argentina and many other chronic inflation countries were predominantly relying on 
external debt.
27  Italian real interest rates right after World War II were as negative as 47 
percent (in 1945). For the Unites States real rates were -8 to -9 percent during 1945-1947 
on average the US had -3.5 percent real rates during the liquidation years).   
Table 4: Incidence and Magnitude of the Liquidation of Public Debt: Selected Countries, 
1945-1980 
Negative Real Interest 
Rate - Liquidation Years 


















Argentina  1944-1974  97.0  1944-1974  15.6  53.3 (1959) 
Australia  1945-1968, 
1971,1976 
48.0  1946-1953,1955-1956,1971,1976  5.6  17.8 (1951) 
Belgium
1  1945-1974  48.0  1945-1948,1951,1963,1969-1974  4.2  9.6 (1974) 
India  1949-1980  53.0  1949,1951,1957,1959-
1960,1964-1968,1970,1972-
1975,1977,1980 
5.4  17.4 (1974) 
Ireland  1965-1990  62.0  1965-1966, 1968-1977,1979-
1982 
4.5  11.1  
(1974) 
Italy







1945-1974  43.0  1945,1947-1949,1951-
1952,1955-1957,1959-1961,1963 
2.3  4.4 (1952) 




2.8  11.9 (1951) 
United 
Kingdom 
1945-1980  47.8  1948-1953,1955-
1956,1958,1962,1965,1969,1971-
1977,1979-1980 
3.8  10.9 (1975) 
United 
States 
1945-1980  25.0  1945-1948,1951,1956-
1957,1974-1975 
3.5  8.8 (1946) 
Notes:  Share of liquidation years is defined as the number of years during which the real interest rate on 
the portfolio is negative divided by the total number of years as noted in column (2). The real interest rate is 
calculated as defined in equation (1).  
1No data available for 1964-1968 
2 The average and minimum real interest rate during liquidation years were calculated over the period 1945-
1970 to exclude war years. 
                                                 
27 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)’s forgotten history of domestic debt. 35 
 
3 In 1944, the negative real return was 82.3 percent. 
 
 
There are two distinct patterns in the ten-country sample evident from an 
inspection of the timing of the incidence and magnitude of the negative real rates.  The 
first of these is the cases where the negative real rates (financial repression tax) were 
most pronounced in the years following World War II (as war debts were importantly 
inflated away).  This pattern is most evident in Australia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, although negative real rates re-emerge following the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods in 1974-1975. Then there are the cases where there is a more persistent or chronic 
reliance on financial repression throughout the sample as a way of funding government 
deficits and/or eroding existing government debts.  The cases of Argentina and India in 
the emerging markets and Ireland and Italy in the advanced economies stand out in this 
regard. 
   The preceding analysis, as noted, adopts a very narrow, conservative calculation 
of both the incidence of the “liquidation effect” or the financial repression tax.  Much of 
the literature on growth, as well as standard calibration exercises involving subjective 
rates of time preference assume benchmark real interest rates of  three percent per annum 
and even higher.  Thus, a threshold that only examines periods where real interest rates 
were actually negative is bound to underestimate the incidence of “abnormally low” real 
interest rates during the era of financial repression (approximately taken to be 1945-
1980).  To assess the incidence of more broadly defined low real interest rates, Table 5 
presents for the 10 core countries the share of years where real returns on a portfolio of 36 
 
government debt (as defined earlier) were below zero (as in Table 4), one, two, and three 
percent, respectively.
28 
In the era of financial repression that we examine here, real ex post interest rates 
on government debt did not reach three percent in a single year in the United States; in 
effect in nearly 2/3 of the years real interest rates were below one percent.  The incidence 
of “abnormally low” real interest rates is comparable for the United Kingdom and 
Australia—both countries which had sharp and relatively rapid declines in public debt to 
GDP following World War II. 
29  Even in countries with substantial economic and 
financial volatility during this period (including Ireland, Italy and South Africa), real 
interest rates on government debt above three percent were relatively rare (accounting for 
only about 20-23 percent of the observations. 
                                                 
28 An alternative strategy would be to use a growth model to calibrate the relationship between the real 
interest rate and output growth for the counterfactual of free markets. That, however, would make the 
results model specific. 
29 “Abnormally low” by the historical standards which include periods of liberalized financial markets 
before and after 1945-1980;  see Homer and Sylla’s (1963)  classic book for a comprehensive and 
insightful history of interest rates. 37 
 
Table 5. Incidence of Liquidation Years for Different Real Interest Rate Thresholds: 
Selected Countries, 1945-1980 
Share of Years with Real Interest Rate below:  Country    
(1) 
Period 






Argentina  1944-1974  97.0  97.0  97.0  97.0 
Australia  1945-1968, 
1971,1976 
48.0  65.4  80.8  92.3 
Belgium
1  1945-1974  48.0  65.4  72.0  80.0 
India  1949-1980  53.0  62.5  71.9  78.1 
Ireland  1965-1990  62.0  65.4  73.1  76.9 
Italy
2  1945-1970  41.0  50.0  53.8  76.9 
South Africa  1945-1974  43.0  53.3  66.7  80.0 
Sweden  1945-1965, 
1984-1990 
35.7  39.3  60.7  75.0 
United 
Kingdom 
1945-1980  47.8  72.2  86.1  97.2 
United States  1945-1980  25.0  63.9  88.9  100.0 
Notes:  Share of liquidation years is defined as the number of years during which the real interest rate on 
the portfolio is negative divided by the total number of years as noted in column (2). The real interest rate is 
calculated as defined in equation (1).  
1No data available for 1964-1968 
2 The average and minimum real interest rate during liquidation years were calculated over the period 1945-
1970 to exclude war years. 
2. Estimates of the Liquidation Effect 
Having documented the high incidence of “liquidation years” (even by 
conservative estimates), we now calculate the magnitude of the savings to the 
government (financial repression tax or liquidation effect).  These estimates take “the tax 
rate” (the negative real interest rate) and multiplies it by the “tax base” or the stock of 
debt, Table 6 reports these estimates for each country. 38 
 
 
Table 6: Government Revenues (interest cost savings) from the “Liquidation Effect:” 
per year 
Benchmark Measure  
“Liquidation effect revenues” 
Alternative Measure of 
“Liquidation effect revenues”  Country  Period 
% GDP  % Tax 
Revenues 
% GDP  % Tax 
Revenues 
Argentina  1944-1974  3.2  19.5  3.0  16.6 
Australia  1945-1968, 
1971,1978 
5.1  20.3  n.a.  n.a. 
Belgium  1945-1974  2.5  18.6  3.5  23.9 
India  1949-1980  1.5  27.2  1.5  27.2 
Ireland  1965-1990  2.0  10.3  n.a.  n.a. 
Italy  1945-1970  5.3  127.5  5.9  143.5 
South Africa  1945-1974  1.2  8.9  n.a.  n.a. 
Sweden  1945-1965, 
1984-1990 




1945-1980  3.6  26.0  2.4  17.3 
United States  1945-1980  3.2  18.9  2.5  14.8 
Sources: See data appendix and sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 




The magnitudes are in all cases non-trivial, irrespective of whether we use the 
benchmark measure that is exclusively based on interest rate (coupon yields) or the 
alternative measure that includes capital gains (or losses) for the cases where the bond 
price data is available.  
For the United States and the United Kingdom the annual liquidation of debt via 
negative real interest rates amounted on average from to 3 to 4 percent of GDP a year.  
Obviously, annual deficit reduction of 3 to 4 percent of GDP quickly accumulates (even 
without any compounding) to a 30 to 40 percent of GDP debt reduction in the course of a 
decade.  For Australia and Italy, which recorded higher inflation rates, the liquidation 
effect was larger (around 5 percent per annum).  Interestingly (but not entirely 
surprising), the average annual magnitude of the liquidation effect for Argentina is about 
the same as that of the US, despite the fact that the average real interest rate averaged 39 
 
about -3.5 percent for the US and nearly -16 percent for Argentina during liquidation 
years in the 1945-1980 repression era.  Just as money holdings secularly shrink during 
periods of high and chronic inflation, so does the domestic debt market. 
30 Argentina’ 
“tax base” (domestic public debt) shrank steadily during this period; at the end of World 
War II nearly all public debt was domestic and by the early 1980s domestic debt 
accounted for less than ½ of total public debt.  Without the means to liquidate external 
debts, Argentina defaulted on its external obligations in 1982. 
Countries like Ireland, India, Sweden and South Africa that did not experience a 
massive public debt build-up during World War II recorded more modest annual savings 
(but still substantive) during the heyday of financial repression.
31 
                                                 
30 These issues are examined in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
31 It is important to note that while financial repression wound down in most of the advanced economies in 
the sample by the mid 1980s, it has persisted in varying degrees in India through the present (with its 
system of state-owned banks and widespread capital controls) and in Argentina (except for the years of the 





Table 7. Debt Liquidation through Financial Repression: Selected Countries, 1945-1955 
 
  Public debt/GDP  Annual average: 1946-1955 
Country  1945  1955 (actual)  1955 without  “financial repression  inflation 
      repression   revenue”/GDP   
      savings (est.)
4     
           
Australia  143.8  66.3  199.8  6.2  3.8 
Belgium
1  112.6  63.3  132.2  4.6  8.7 
Italy
2 
  66.9  38.1  81.9  3.7  10.8 
Sweden  52.0  29.6  59.1  1.8  5.0 
United Kingdom
3   215.6  138.2  246.9  4.5  5.9 
United States  116.0  66.2  141.4  6.3  4.2 
           
 
Sources: See data appendix and sources cited therein and authors’ calculations; for debt/GDP see Reinhart 
(2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b). 
1The debt-to-GDP ratio corresponds to 1946  
2 Italy was in default on its external debt 1940-1946
 
3 The savings from financial repression are a lower bound, as we use the “official” consumer price index 
for this period in the calculations and inflation is estimated to have been substantially higher than the 
official figure (see for example Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). 
4 The simple cumulative annual savings without compounding. 
Notes: The peaks in debt/GDP were: Italy 129.0 in 1943; United Kingdom 247.5 in 1946; United States 
121.3 in 1946.  An alternative interpretation of the financial repression revenue is simply as savings in 
interest service on the debt. 
 
VI. Inflation and Debt Reduction 
We have argued that inflation is most effective in liquidating government debts 
(or debts in general), when interest rates are not able to respond to the rise in inflation and 
in inflation expectations.
32  This disconnect between nominal interest rates and inflation 
can occur if:  (i) the setting is one where interest rates are either administered or 
predetermined (via financial repression, as described); (ii) all government debts are fixed-
rate and long maturities and the government has no new financing needs (even if there is 
no financial repression the long maturities avoid rising interest costs that would otherwise 
                                                 
32 That is, the coefficient in the Fisher equation is less than one. 41 
 
prevail if short maturity debts needed to be rolled over); and (iii) all (or nearly all) debt is 
liquidated in one “surprise” inflation spike.   
Our attention thus far has been confined to the first on that list, the financial 
repression environment.  The second scenario, where governments only have long-term, 
fixed-rate debt outstanding and have no new financing needs (deficits) remain to be 
identified (however, these authors have a sense such episodes are relatively rare).  This 
leaves the third case where debts are swiftly liquidated via an inflation spike (or perhaps 
more appropriately surge).  To attempt to identify potential episodes of the latter, we 
conduct two simple exercises.  
In the first exercise, we identify inflation “surprises” for the core ten-country 
sample. In order to identify inflation surprises we calculate a 10-year moving average 
inflation, and count a year as an “inflation surprise” year if the inflation during that year 
is two standard deviations above the corresponding 10-year average.
33 Table 8 presents 
the results. The second column shows the share of years which are “inflation surprises” 
during the sample period while the third shows the share of years which are both an 
“inflation surprise” and a “liquidation year”. 
As Table 8 highlights, there is not much overlap between debt liquidation years 
and inflation surprises, as defined here. Averaging across the 10 countries, only 18 
percent of the liquidation years coincide with an “inflation surprise.” In the case of South 
Africa, for instance, none of the liquidation years overlap with inflation surprises.  The 
high incidence of inflation surprises years during the early 1970s at the time of the surge 
                                                 
33 The pertinent 10-year average for determining whether year t is an inflation surprise or not is calculated 
over the interval t-10 to t-1. 42 
 
in oil and commodity prices, suggests our crude methodology to identify “inflation 
surprises (or spikes)” may be a reasonable approximation to the real thing.  More to the 
point, this exercise suggests that the role of inflation in the liquidation of debt is 
predominantly of the more chronic variety coupled with financially-repressed nominal 
interest rates.   
Table 8: Do Inflation Surprises Coincide with Debt Liquidation? 10 countries, 1945-1980 
Country  Share of “inflation 
surprise” years 
 
Share of  liquidation 





Argentina  26.7  27.6  1945,1946,1949-
1951,1959,1972,1973 
Australia  7.7  16.7  1951,1966 
Belgium  12.0  25.0  1972-1974 
India  6.3  10.5  1973,1974 
Ireland  11.5  20.0  1970,1972,1973 
Italy  7.7  18.2  1962,1963 
South Africa  13.9  0.0  1964,1971-1974 
Sweden  3.6  11.1  1951 
United Kingdom  13.9  23.5  1970,1971,1973-1975 




*Shown in italics are “inflation surprise” years which do not coincide with liquidation years. 
 
 Our algorithm for the second exercise begins by identifying debt-reduction 
episodes and then focusing on the largest of these.  Any decline in debt/GDP over a three 
year window classifies as a debt-reduction episode.  .  For this pool of debt-reduction 
episodes, we construct their frequency distribution (for each country) and focus on the 
lower (ten percent) tail of the distribution to identify the “largest” three-year debt 43 
 
reduction episodes.  This algorithm biases our selection of episodes toward the more 
sudden (or abrupt) ones (even if these are later reversed) which might a priori be 
attributable to some combination of a booming economy, a substantive fiscal austerity 
plan, or a burst in inflation/liquidation, or explicit default or restructuring. A milder but 
steady debt reduction process that lasts over many years would be identified as a series of 
episodes—but if the decline in debt over any particular  three-year window is modest it 
may not be large enough to fall in the lower ten percent of all the observations.   
This exercise helps flag episodes where inflation is likely to have played a 
significant role in public debt reduction but does not provide estimates of how much debt 
was liquidated (as in the preceding analysis).  Because we only require information on 
domestic public debt/GDP and inflation, we expand our coverage to 28 countries 
predominantly (but not exclusively) over 1900-2009. Thus, we are not exclusively 
focusing on the period of financial repression but examining more broadly into the role of 
inflation and debt reduction in the countries’ histories. 
Our algorithm begins by identifying debt-reduction episodes and then focusing on 
the largest of these.  Any decline in debt/GDP over a three year window classifies as a 
debt-reduction episode.  For this pool of debt-reduction episodes, we construct their 
frequency distribution (for each country) and focus on the lower (ten percent) tail of the 
distribution to identify the “largest” three-year debt reduction episodes.  This algorithm 
biases our selection of episodes toward the more sudden (or abrupt) ones (even if these 
are later reversed) which might a priori be attributable to some combination of a booming 
economy, a substantive fiscal austerity plan, or a burst in inflation/liquidation, or explicit 
default or restructuring. A milder but steady debt reduction process that lasts over many 44 
 
years would be identified as a series of episodes—but if the decline in debt over any 
particular  three-year window is modest it may not be large enough to fall in the lower ten 
percent of all the observations.   
Table 9 lists the largest debt reduction episodes by country, the last year of the 3-
year episode is shown and for each country; the year that appears in italics represents the 
largest single-episode of debt reduction.  The next two columns of the table are devoted 
to the average and median inflation performance during the debt reduction episodes listed 
in the second column in comparison to the inflation performance (average and median) 
for the full sample (the coverage, which varies by country, is shown in Table A.2).  In 22 
of 28 countries, inflation is significantly higher in the episodes of debt reduction than for 
the full sample. In the extreme cases, it is the wholesale liquidation of domestic debt, 
such as during the German hyperinflation of the early 1920s and the long-lasting 
Brazilian and Argentine hyperinflations of the early 1990s.  Even without these extreme 
cases, the inflation differentials between the debt reduction episodes and the full sample 
are suggestive of the use of inflation (intentionally or because it became unmanageable) 
to reduce (or liquidate) government debts even in periods outside the era of heavy 
financial repressions.  The evidence is only suggestive of this interpretation, as no 





Table 9 Inflation Performance during Major Domestic Public Debt Reduction Episodes: 
28 Countries, 1790-2009 
 
Average Median Average Median
Argentina
1900-1902 ,1990,2006-2007 479.8 8.2 82.5 8.6
Australia 1948,1949-1953 10.3 9.3 3.0 2.5
Belgium 1925-28, 1949 10.7 12.8 2.0 1.9
Brazil 1990-1992,1995-1996 898.2 980.2 111.3 11.3
Canada 1948,1949-1952 7.3 5.3 3.2 2.5
Chile 1993 -1997, 2004-2007 7.7 6.1 17.7 5.5
Colombia 2008, 2009 8.5 6.3 12.6 10.8
Egypt 2008 12.0 8.6 11.7 9.9
Finland 1946-1949 34.5 24.9 10.4 3.9
France 1924, 1926-1927, 1938 11.1 12.6 6.4 2.7
Germany 1922, 1923 5555049529.6 1764.7 231460401.3 2.3
Greece 1925-1927 23.7 12.8 8.0 5.1
India 1958 , 1996, 2006 7.1 6.2 6.6 6.2
Ireland 1972, 1982 , 1998 9.8 8.6 5.9 3.7
Italy 1945, 1946 -1948 106.7 44.3 10.6 2.6
Japan 1898, 1912 -1913 7.6 6.7 3.6 2.6
Korea 1986 2.5 2.5 6.3 4.6
Malaysia 1995 8.4 8.8 6.9 5.4
Mexico 1991, 1992 , 1993 18.9 20.0 13.3 5.6
New Zealand 1935-1937, 1950-1952 4.9 5.3 4.2 2.8
Phillipines 1998, 2007 -2008 7.2 7.7 7.7 6.2
South Africa 1935, 1952, 1981, 2001-
2002
7.0 6.6 5.8 4.9
Sweden 1948, 1952, 1989, 2001 -
2003, 2009
4.7 3.2 4.4 3.2
Thailand 1989-1990 4.4 4.6 4.8 3.8
Turkey 1943, 2006-2008 23.2 9.2 25.3 9.7
UK 1836, 1846, 1854, 1936, 
1940, 1948-1950 ,1951-
1954
4.7 3.7 2.7 1.8
US 1794-1796, 1881-1882, 
1948-1952 , 1953, 1957, 
1966
4.0 2.6 1.6 1.7
Venezuela 1989, 1997 -1998, 2006-
2007
41.6 29.5 11.4 5.8




*A debt reduction episode is defined as a decline in the domestic public debt/GDP ratio over a three-year 
window.  The dates shown are for the largest three-year declines recorded during the full sample period as 
shown in Table A.2. 
Notes: The largest annual (single-year) decline recorded in debt/GDP is shown year shown in italics under 
the Dates column.  For example, for Germany this was the hyperinflation year 1923; for the United States it 
was 1952, the year following a substantial debt conversion (see Table 2). 46 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The substantial tax on financial savings imposed by the financial repression that 
characterized 1945-1980 was a major factor explaining the relatively rapid reduction of 
public debt in a number of the advanced economies.  This fact has been largely 
overlooked in the literature and discussion on debt reduction. The UK’s history offers a 
pertinent illustration. Following the Napoleonic Wars, the UK’s public debt was a 
staggering 260 percent of GDP; it took over 40 years to bring it down to about 100 
percent (a massive reduction in an era of price stability and high capital mobility 
anchored by the gold standard).  Following World War II, the UK’s public debt ratio was 
reduced by a comparable amount in 20 years. 
34 
 The financial repression route taken at the creation of the Bretton Woods system 
was facilitated by initial conditions after the war, which had left a legacy of pervasive 
domestic and financial restrictions.   Indeed, even before the outbreak of World War II, 
the pendulum had begun to swing away from laissez-faire financial markets toward 
heavier-handed regulation in response to the widespread financial crises of 1929-1931.  
But one cannot help thinking that part of the design principle of the Bretton Woods 
system was to make it easier to work down massive debt burdens.  The legacy of 
financial crisis made it easier to package those policies as prudential. 
To deal with the current debt overhang, similar policies to those documented here 
may re-emerge in the guise of prudential regulation rather than under the politically 
incorrect label of financial repression. Moreover, the process where debts are being 
                                                 
34Peak debt/GDP was 260.6 in 1819 and 237.9 percent in 1947.  Real GDP growth was about the same 
during the two debt reduction periods (1819-1859) and (1947-1967), averaging about 2.5 percent per 
annum (the comparison is not exact as continuous GDP data begins in 1830).  As such, higher growth 
cannot obviously account for the by far faster debt reduction following World War II. 47 
 
“placed” at below market interest rates in pension funds and other more captive domestic 
financial institutions is already under way in several countries in Europe.  There are many 
bankrupt (or nearly so) pension plans at the state level in the United States that bear 
scrutiny (in addition to the substantive unfunded liabilities at the federal level).  
Markets for government bonds are increasingly populated by nonmarket players, 
notably central banks of the United States, Europe and many of the largest emerging 
markets, calling into question what the information content of bond prices are relatively 
to their underlying risk profile.  This decoupling between interest rates and risk is a 
common feature of financially repressed systems.  With public and private external debts 
at record highs, many advanced economies are increasingly looking inward for public 
debt placements.  
 While to state that initial conditions on the extent of global integration are vastly 
different at the outset of Bretton Woods in 1946 and today is an understatement, the 
direction of regulatory changes have many common features.  The incentives to reduce 
the debt overhang are more compelling today than about half a century ago.  After World 
War II, the overhang was limited to public debt (as the private sector had painfully 
deleveraged through the 1930s and the war); at present, the debt overhang many 
advanced economies face encompasses (in varying degrees) households, firms, financial 
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Appendix I. Appendix Tables and Literature Review 














Before -2.83 -0.64 -1.80 -0.04 -2.66
After 2.61 3.86 3.83 6.98 3.46
Before -0.50 1.29 -0.38 3.21 2.19
After 1.75 4.14 3.68 6.94 2.96
Before 18.69 0.58 -3.61 -0.21
After 46.41 145.46 76.97 -21.87
Before 2.07 -0.11 3.83 -0.65
After 1.04 2.47 3.71 2.15
Before 12.88 -12.49 28.39
After 3.35 5.61 8.22
Before -5.37 -3.64 -0.79
After 6.14 7.72 11.04
Before -5.65 -0.40 -1.43
After 0.99 3.78 6.00
Before -2.68 -2.83 1.43 -1.12
After 1.46 2.94 4.00 4.51
Before -3.09 -3.28 0.21 -0.46 -3.22
After 1.33 4.92 4.58 5.70 3.20
Before 0.94 0.69 1.11 3.92 0.60
After 2.32 1.98 2.60 7.92 2.41
Before 0.52 0.57 3.36 -1.88
After 0.19 2.88 6.19 0.93
Before 0.26 0.38 6.77
After 1.11 1.45 5.86
Before -4.02 0.04 -1.84 -1.52 -2.16
After -1.11 4.12 3.13 3.57 2.84
Before -3.30 -2.97 -1.44 1.47 -2.66
After 0.94 4.70 3.59 6.22 3.32
Before -2.13 -7.18 0.53 1.60 -1.61
After 0.52 1.11 1.77 2.97 1.31
Before 3.71 -1.71 5.19 3.38 7.94
After 2.79 -0.56 3.75 3.93 4.08
Before 1.86 1.05 -0.32 6.96 0.82
























































Before -2.82 -1.47 -6.62
After -1.19 1.96 2.88
Before -2.96 -0.40 -1.79 -3.08
After 4.01 5.15 8.18 4.83
Before -3.74 -0.62 -2.44 -0.64 -1.98
After 1.23 0.35 2.95 5.70 3.57
Before -4.33 -0.40 -1.30 1.95 -1.61
After 1.72 2.56 2.09 5.56 1.82
Before -0.55 -0.51 -0.29 1.23 -0.61
After 1.28 1.19 3.88 5.12 2.97
Before 4.03 4.31 4.82 7.08 1.61
After 2.39 3.10 2.22 5.83 -0.16
Before -10.77 -3.68 4.69
After 2.06 -0.84 3.99
Before -2.41 -0.14 -6.22 -2.00 -1.23
After 3.20 3.68 3.88 4.54 3.64
Before 2.04 -0.12 1.00 2.09 -0.31
After 1.43 1.61 2.19 4.72 1.77
Before -8.06 -0.18 -5.56































Table A1.2. Measuring “Taxes” from Financial Repression:  Selected Papers 
Study  Measure(s)  of financial 
repression 




End-of-year effective reserve 
requirements ratios are calculated 
(see entry under Brock). The 
authors calculate how important a 
share of seignorage is accounted 
for by the reserve requirement tax. 
32 advanced and 
emerging market 
economies 1980-1991. 
Reserve ratios are higher 
for emerging markets. 
Among the advanced 
economies the highest 
share of seignorage 
accounted for by reserve 
ratios is Italy over this 
period. For the emerging 
markets, Chile and  Peru 





Six measures (real interest rates, 
reserve ratio, liquidity, private 
borrowing, bank lending, and stock 
market capitalization) of financial 
repression are used to construct an 
aggregate index.  Their aim is to 
provide a broad-brush cross-
country comparison at a particular 
point in time—not a “tax 
equivalent” to the government.  
All countries, advanced 
and emerging-data 
permitting. The most 
comprehensive coverage 
is for 1997. The annual 
indices are reported for 
1970 and for 1990 for a 
subset of countries. The 
period of heaviest 
repression 1945-early 
1970s is not part of the 
analysis. 
Based on the cross-
sectional evidence, the 
authors conclude that 
financial development 
(the opposite of 
repression) contributes 
importantly to economic 
development and 
growth. 
Brock (1989)  End-of-year effective reserve 
requirements ratios are calculated 
as base money less currency in 
circulation (central bank reserves) 
divided broad money (or money 
plus quasi-money).  Looks at the 
correlation between inflation rates 
and the reserve ratio. 
41 advanced and 
emerging market 
economies 1960-1984. 
Reserve ratios are higher 
for emerging markets. 
Among the advanced 
economies these are 
highest for Australia and 
Italy over this period. A 
positive relationship 
between inflation and 
reserve requirements is 
mostly present in the 
chronic high inflation 




Net domestic transfers from the 
financial system and tax on 
financial intermediation.  Uses 
inflation-adjusted  flow of funds 
analysis to calculate the size of the 
transfers from reserve 
requirements, inflation tax, etc, 
A dozen relatively large 
emerging markets. 
Flow-of-funds balance 
sheet from 1971 to1986. 
Estimates are highest for 
Mexico and Yugoslavia 
among the 12 countries, 
reaching 12-16 percent 





Focus on real interest rates on 
deposits and calculate the 
repression tax revenue (from that 
source) as the difference between 
domestic rates and comparable 
rates in OECD countries multiplied 
by the end-of-period stock of 
deposits (the tax base). 
Nine emerging markets, 
1970-1988 (the revenue 
calculations are for less 
than half of the 
countries) 
This component of the 
financial repression tax 
is in the order of 1-2 
percent of GDP. 
       55 
 
Study  Measure(s)  of financial 
repression 
 
Sample and coverage  -Highlight of findings 
Giovannini 
and de Melo 
(1993) 
The effective interest rate on 
external (domestic) debt are 
calculated as the ratio of external 
(domestic) interest payments to the 
stock of external (domestic) debt.  
The government revenue from 
financial repression is calculated 
by computing the differential 
between the foreign borrowing cost 
and the domestic borrowing cost, 




(usually shorter period), 
depending on the 
country. The 24- 
developing-country 
sample does include 
Greece and Portugal as 
emerging markets. 
Annual estimates of the 
“revenue from financial 
repression” are 
estimated from a low of 
0.5 percent of GDP for 
Zaire (with its small 
domestic debt market to 
a high of about 6 percent 
for Mexico. 
Estimates for Greece 
and Portugal are 2-2.5 
percent of GDP. 
 
Table A1.2 sketches the approach, sample and findings of six papers that have in 
different ways attempted to quantify some of the dimensions of financial repression. 
While Beim and Calomiris (2001) primarily aim to rank a cross section of countries at a 
point  (or two) in time to link the measures extent of financial repression to growth and 
development, the remaining papers do attempt to quantify some of the financial 
repression “revenue” equivalents. For instance, the papers dealing with reserve 
requirements capture the tax on financial institutions.  Ultimately, (as Reinhart and 
Reinhart, 1999 document) the banks pass this tax on to depositors (via lower deposit 
rates), non-government borrowers (via higher lending rates) or both, depending who has 
the most access to alternatives. If households are barred from holding foreign assets 
and/or gold (see Table 2), lower deposits are tolerated more readily.  If domestic banks 
are the only game in town for the firms—they will have to live with the higher lending 
rates. 
The Giovannini and deMelo (1993) paper is closest in spirit to our fundamental 
two-part intertwined question (i) what is the annual saving on interest payments domestic 
debt? (ii) what the magnitude of the erosion or liquidation on the existing stock of debt 56 
 
due to negative real interest rates.  Giovannini and de Melo (1993) compare “effective 
interest rates” on external debt to the potentially repressed “effective interest rates on 
domestic debt” (See Table A1.2). This is a natural exercise for emerging markets (the 
focus of their analysis) for the period that they consider (1974-1987), as emerging market 
governments were funding themselves through both domestic and external borrowing (in 
varying degrees), as documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).  The market-determined 
interest rate on external debt is a logical benchmark under such circumstances.  However, 
there are two compelling reasons why this approach is neither feasible nor desirable for 
our purposes. First, some countries (like the United States and the Netherlands) do not 
have and have not had historically external debt.
35  All government debts are issued under 
domestic law and in the domestic currency, irrespective of whether the holders of the 
debt are domestic pension funds or foreign central banks.  Second, most emerging 
markets had little or no external debt during the heyday of the financial repression era 
during Bretton Woods (1945-1973); the depression of the 1930s and the subsequent 
world war had all but eradicated global debt markets.
                                                 
35 Apart from a trivial amount  of Carter-bonds in the 1970s the US debt is domestic (homogenous) whether 
it is held by residents or nonresidents 57 
 
 
Table A1.3 Extended Sample for Inflation and Domestic Debt Reduction Analysis: 28 
Countries, 1790-2009 
 
Country  Sample Period  Country  Sample Period 
Argentina  1884-2009  Italy  1914-2009 
Australia  1914-2009  Japan  1885-1940,  1952-2009 
Belgium  1920-1939,1946-2009  Korea  1976-2005 
Brazil  1900-2009  Malaysia  1955-1957, 1976-2009 
Canada  1925-2007  Mexico  1918-1967, 1976-2009 
Chile  1927-1930,1937-
1953,1978-2009 
New Zealand  1932-2008 
Colombia  1923-2009  Philippines  1948-2009 
Egypt  1993-2009  South Africa  1911-2009 
Finland  1915-2009  Sweden  1880-2009 
France  1920-1938, 1949-
2009 
Thailand  1950-2009 
Germany  1920-1938, 1950-
2009 
Turkey  1933-1972, 1976-2009 
Greece  1920-1939, 1950-
1965, 1978-1981, 
1993-2009 
United Kingdom  1830-2009 
India  1950-2009  United States  1790-2009 
Ireland  1948-2008  Venezuela  1921-2009 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and (2011) and sources cited therein. 58 
 
Appendix II. Data Appendix 
 
Table A.2.1 Structure of Domestic Government Debt: Coupon, Maturity, Bond Prices, 
and Tax Revenues 
Country  Period Covered  Source  Notes 
Argentina  1944-1974 
 
1944-1974 
Ministerio de Hacienda 
 
Banco Central de la República 
Argentina 
Detailed composition of government 
debt is taken to indicate here as 
having data on: Outstanding debt 
stock (end of calendar or fiscal year) 
by coupon yield (instrument by 
instrument). Maturity of each 
instrument. In some cases it includes 




Prices of government bonds.  
Australia  1945-1968 
1971,1976 
Australia Bureau of Statistics 
The Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia 
Detailed composition of government 
debt (see above). 
Belgium  1945-1974 
 
Banque Nationale de Belgique 
 
Detailed composition of the 
government debt and bond prices.  
Brazil  1964-1993  Banco Central do Brasil 
 
Series Historicas. Divida 
Publica 
Estatísticas históricas do 
Brasil: séries econômicas, 
demográficas e sociais de 
1550 a 1988- IBGE 
Some debt data. Information on 
coefficient of monetary correction. 
Debt data, maturity structure 
 
Tax Revenues, GDP 
India  1949-1980  Reserve Bank of India  Detailed composition of the 
government debt, bond prices and 
tax revenues. 
Ireland  1965-1990 
1965-1990 
Department of Finance 
Central Statistics Office 
Detailed debt data 
Tax Revenues 
Italy  1945-1970 
1951-1970 
Istituto Centrale di Statistica 
Banca d’Italia 
Detailed composition of the 
government debt. 
South Africa  1945-1980  Control and Audit Office  Detailed composition of the 
government debt and tax revenues. 
 
Source: Sbrancia (2011) and sources cited therein. 59 
 
Table A2.1 Structure of Domestic Government Debt: Coupon, Maturity, Bond Prices, 
and Tax Revenues (continued) 
Country  Period   Source  Notes 
Sweden  1945-1965, 
1984-1990 
Riksgäldskontoret 








Bank of England 
Central Statistical Office 
Bond price data begins in 1960 
Detailed composition of the 
government debt. Tax Revenues 
United States  1945-1980 
1945-1980 
 
Department of Treasury 
Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) 
database 




Source: Sbrancia (2011) and sources cited therein. 60 
 
Table A.2.2 Two Examples of Government Debt Profiles. India and the United States 
 
India: Composition of Domestic Debt for Selected Years, 1950-1970  
(as percentage of total domestic debt) 
  1950  1960  1970 
Marketable Rupee Loans  59  48  39 
Treasury Bills  15  25  21 
Small Savings  17  17  19 
Other Obligations  9  10  21 
 
 
United States: Composition of Domestic Debt for Selected Years, 1946-1976 
 (as percentage of total domestic debt) 
  1946  1956  1966  1976 
Interest bearing obligations         
   Marketable obligations  67.3  58.0  65.8  64.5 
     Treasury Bills  6.5  9.1  20.3  25.1 
     Certificates of Indebtedness  11.4  6.9     
     Treasury Notes  3.8  12.8  17.8  33.2 
     Treasury Bonds  45.5  29.2  27.7  6.2 
     Other Bonds 
 
0.1  0.0  0.0  0. 
 Non-marketable obligations  22.7  24.7  16.7  35.4 
 Special Issues 
 
9.4  16.5  16.6  n.a. 
Matured debt on which interest has 
ceased 
0.2  0.3  0.1  0.1 
Debt bearing no interest  0.4  0.6  0.8  0.1 
 





Figure A. 2.1 Two Examples of Effective Nominal Interest Rates on Public Debt: India 
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Source: Sbrancia (2011).62 
 
Table I.2 Interest Rates: deposit, discount, lending and T-Bill rates. 
Country Interest Rate Source
Argentina Deposit Rate Banco Central de la Republica Argentina
Discount Rate
Lending Rate
















Chile Deposit Rate Banco Central de Chile
Discount Rate
Lending Rate
Colombia Deposit Rate Banco de la Republica de Colombia
Discount Rate
Lending Rate




Finland Deposit Rate Bank of Finland
Discount Rate
Lending Rate
France Deposit Rate Banque de France
Discount Rate
Lending Rate





Country Interest Rate Source








India Discount Rate Reserve Bank of India
Lending Rate
T-Bill Rate




















Mexico Deposit Rate Banco de Mexico
Lending Rate
T-Bill Rate






Country Interest Rate Source
















Turkey Deposit Rate Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi
Discount Rate
T-Bill Rate




United States Deposit Rate Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Discount Rate
Lending Rate
T-Bill Rate Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Venezuela Deposit Rate Banco Central de Venezuela
Discount Rate
Lending Rate  
 